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Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence
of a Federal General Common Law
of Arbitration
Professor Kenneth F. Dunham*

INTRODUCTION

Some legal scholars opine that the current law on arbitration agreements
is a natural evolution of American contract law, while others are of the
opinion that binding contractual arbitration is a violation of existing federal
law.' The positions taken by the academic and the legal communities on
arbitration have developed from the same factual events, case law, and
statutes. This raises a question over how so many people could examine the
same material and defend positions which are polar opposites? Paradise for
some, yet purgatory for others, the binding pre-dispute arbitration clause
evokes a night and day reaction depending upon who is polled.
Few legal scholars would argue that arbitration law in the United States
today is totally different from arbitration law in the United States prior to
1925.2
From colonial times until the passage of the United States
Arbitration Act (USAA) in 1925, binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements

* Associate Professor of Law, ADR Director, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Faulkner
University.
1. For example, the work of two legal scholars yields opposite results. Professor Stephen
Ware makes the evolution of law argument and has voiced his support of binding contractual
arbitration in numerous law review and journal articles. STEPHEN WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (2001). He has also voiced his support of binding contractual arbitration in numerous
law review and journal articles. Professor Jean Stemlight has written numerous articles criticizing
the effects of binding contractual arbitration, especially in consumer cases. See Jean Sternlight,
Address at the Roscoe Pound Institute 2003 Forum for State Court Judges: The Rise and Spread of
Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial (July 19, 2003). Professor Sternlight argues
that arbitration is becoming a substitute for jury trials and interferes with access to justice by
depriving claimants of their Seventh Amendment rights. Id.
2. Both of the above listed professors in their works and numerous other legal scholars in
their contributions to the field agree that the American arbitration landscape in 1924 bore little
resemblance to today's broadened picture of enforcement of nearly every kind of arbitration
agreement. See WARE, supra note 1; Sternlight, supra note 1.
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were considered unenforceable in most United States courts.3

One of the

chief arguments against binding contractual arbitration is that Congress
never intended the USAA to be more than a federal procedural act
applicable only in the federal court system.4 Supporters of binding
contractual arbitration argue that Congress actually intended the USAA to be
substantive law applicable in all courts.' Therefore, a historical perspective
is critical when developing a position on this issue.
The USAA became codified in 1947, as Title 9 U.S.C. § 1, known as the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).6 The federal cases in which the FAA is
scrutinized may be placed into two general categories. Category one
includes cases prior to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Southland
Corp. v. Keating, which consistently held that the FAA was to be applied as

a federal procedural act with judicial preference for its use.7 Southland held
that the FAA was applicable in all courts as substantive law. Prior to
Southland, the FAA was generally understood to be a federal procedural act
applicable only in the federal courts.8

3. Prior to the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, the vast majority of
states followed the old common law arbitration doctrine of revocability. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). Professor MacNeil describes the
American arbitration scene prior to 1925 in great detail. Id.
4. David H. Taylor and Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted
Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1085, 1098-1103 (2002). See also Justice O'Connor's dissent in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
5. See Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 1.
6. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
7. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). This case held that the FAA should no
longer be considered a procedural act applicable only in federal courts, but was substantive law
applicable in all courts. Id. at 16. Justice Burger opined in Southland,
In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require ajudicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.... The Federal Arbitration
Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause ....
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements
enforceable only in the federal courts.
Id. at 10-12. Justice O'Connor dissented and argued that the FAA was a procedural act applicable
only in federal courts. Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
joined with Justice O'Connor in the dissent which stated in part, "[i]n 1925 Congress emphatically
believed arbitration to be a matter of 'procedure' .....
Today's decision is unfaithful to
congressional intent, unnecessary, and in light of the FAA's antecedents and the intervening
contraction of federal power, inexplicable." Id. at 36. The intervening contraction of federal power
likely referred to the Court's presumed power to decide general law before Erie. Southlandbecame
the seminal case on federal preemption of state law by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.
8. Southland,465 U.S. at 25-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Thus, category two includes cases decided after 1984, in which the
federal courts consistently held that the FAA is substantive law and therefore
preempts contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause. 9
Southland's critics have charged that it has led to a body of federal
general common law of arbitration which is theoretically prohibited by the
holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.'0 The view by proponents of
binding contractual arbitration is that Southland was not a 180 degree turn
from the high court's prior opinions on the effect of the FAA. Southland
was the first case which clearly set forth the Commerce Clause position the
Court had endeavored to take in earlier cases." Southland, according to its
supporters, was not an end run around the Erie principle, but a result of the
Erie principle's application to existing federal law.' 2
This article postulates that reinterpretation of statutes from the bench is
a not so rare an occurrence, especially in federal courts. The United States
Constitution Article III, § 2 grants the Supreme Court and inferior federal
courts the power to interpret federal statutes. 13 The federal courts regularly
interpret the intent of Congress in federal statutes; even though the statutes
subject to judicial interpretation may have been in place for decades.
Obviously, Southland's interpretation of the intent of Congress in 1925,
when it passed the USAA/FAA, was not based on a consultation with the
deceased original sponsors of the legislation, but rather on a careful
examination of statutory language.1 4 Some of Southland's dissenters argue
that the real harm in Southland lies in the fact that the Court changed

9. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
10. Southland, 465 U.S. at 25-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Conner opined that the
Court reinterpreted an existing procedural act (i.e., the FAA) to create substantive law, in order to
usurp the Erie Doctrine. See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). The principle
holding in Erie was that in federal courts except when a matter is governed by the U.S. Constitution
or a federal statute, the law to be applied is the law of the state. Id. at 78. The rationale behind the
holding was that federal courts lacked the power to declare substantive rules through case law. Id.
Hence, the conclusion reached in Eriewas that federal general common law does not exist. Id.

11. In earlier cases the Supreme Court wrestled with the relationship between state law and the
FAA, but never concluded that the FAA was substantive law. The Supreme Court's struggle with
the federalism suggested by Erie is illustrated in Bernhardt v. PolygraphicCo. ofAm., 350 U.S. 198
(1956). The Supreme Court in Bernhardt made references to the federal law of arbitration, but
declined to rule that the FAA preempted state law. Id. at 205; see also JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN
ScoTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, ARBITRATION 55-56 (1996).

12. The supporters of arbitration have argued that Erie actually helped the Supreme Court to
move toward the holding in Southland. See WARE, supra note 1, at 28-30.
13. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
14. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-14.
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existing law from the bench. 5 Some of these dissenters were on the
Southland Court and voiced their opposition in Southland.16
The following pages contain a brief discussion of the history of
arbitration in the United States, followed by a history of the FAA, and a
discussion of the intent behind the original USAA in 1925. This article
postulates that the Court opinions prior to Southland in favor of arbitration
allowed the Court majority in Southland to avoid the limitations of the Erie
principle against creating a body of federal general common law through
interpretation and clarification of the intent of Congress. Although prior
federal court decisions did not hold that federal procedural law was
substantive law applicable in state courts, the language in several older
Supreme Court opinions indicates the high court has been troubled for many
years by such issues as state court forum shopping.17 Through analysis of
Southland's progeny, this article contends that Southland was not a surprise
holding, but a holding consistent with a pattern of movement by federal
courts away from federal procedure status toward substantive law status for
the FAA.
I.

ADDRESSING THE ERIE PROBLEM

There is a handlebar shaped pile of rocks at the entrance to the Marina
Del Rey yacht basin not shown on most Los Angeles city maps. At the
ocean end of the Marina Del Rey channel a massive collection of boulders
serves as a breakwater jetty. Yachtsmen sailing into or out of Marina Del
Rey must sail around this barrier in order to arrive at their destination. The
skilled sailor does not sail into the rocks, but tacks to change direction
thereby avoiding them. Established legal principles are sometimes like this
jetty, because rock solid legal principles sometimes act as barriers to
progress. When progress is needed, those outdated principles can be sailed
around by skilled members of the judiciary employing analytical tools to
interpret old statutes in a new light. This is not an unfair or even unusual
method of gaining access to the desired destination.

15. Southland,465 U.S. at 33-3 6 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 21-36.
17. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1945). This case held that federal
courts cannot "create" substantive rights denied by state courts in diversity cases, and cannot deny
substantive rights created by state law in accordance with Erie. Id. at 106. The outcome in federal
court or in state court should be the same under Erie; federal courts cannot allow plaintiffs to forum
shop between courts depending upon the outcome they desire. Id. at 109. In diversity cases the
same outcome must be available in state courts and federal courts, and this is accomplished by
following the state statutes. Id.
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In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that

"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.' ' 18 Erie
was intended to act as a complete barrier to federal courts from attempting to
legislate from the bench when navigating diversity cases.' 9 Erie allegedly
forced those courts to follow state law.2 ° Prior to Erie, federal courts were
free to chart their own course in diversity cases, even if that course ignored
the public policies of the states.2' Post Erie, federal courts, at least
theoretically, could no longer craft decisions that ignored state law principles
in diversity cases to create a body of federal general common law in a
subject area.22

Erie's purpose was to force federal courts to consistently apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity removal cases.23
However, the Erie principle has never been an ironclad doctrine applicable
in all cases at all times.24 The survival of removal actions in federal courts
usually depends upon state law principles, 25 but federal common law
controls the interpretation of federal statutory intent.26 Erie was never
intended to bar federal courts in diversity cases from interpreting existing
federal statutes. Its purpose was to stop federal courts from creating new
federal law that ignored existing state law principles when the case was
based upon state law. A general state choice-of-law clause within a
arbitration agreement does not force FAA mandates to yield to state law,
because agreements to arbitrate are controlled by a federal statute not state
law.27 Therefore, even under the Erie principle, state law cannot bar binding
arbitration under the FAA.28
18. Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 78.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 78.
23. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). Under the Erie doctrine,
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive and federal procedural law.
24. Hill v. Martinez, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (Colo. 2000) (State law controls in federal diversity
cases unless it is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution).
25. Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474
(1992). Survival of some federal actions depends upon the state laws of the state in which the
federal court sits. Id.
26. United States v. NEC Corp., 11 F.3d 136 (1 th Cir. 1993).
27. Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2002).
28. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992). State adhesion laws
cannot nullify an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA. Id.
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Southland and subsequent, opinions interpreting the FAA have resulted
in a body of federal substantive law regarding arbitrability a9 This body of
federal law preempts state law even if the contract containing the arbitration
clause purports to be governed by state law. Thus, for all practical purposes,
state law has been ousted from the arbitration arena by coupling the FAA
with the Commerce Clause. It is necessary to understand the history of
binding arbitration agreements in the United States and additionally
understand the history of the FAA in order to understand the current state of
arbitration law in the United States.
II.

THE HISTORY OF PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES

The idea of a general common law developed early in the recorded
history of England.o It was brought to the colonies by the English, and this
common law was incorporated into the body of United States law.3
Common law probably originated from the solidification of customs into
case law. 32 English monarchs were not concerned with the needs and
interests of commoners, so the common law served as a safety net for public
freedom.3 3 Under King Henry II, court decisions were written down and
filed under various categories for future reference. 34 A filing system allowed
future judges to review prior decisions in the same category of law, and the
case collection developed into binding precedents, or stare decisis. English
courts rarely reconsidered issues of a similar nature.35 Once a recognized
case set forth a principle to be followed, most judges followed
the stare
36
decisis, even if they might personally wish to do otherwise.
Common law and arbitration have a long and somewhat adversarial
relationship.37 In fact, the purpose of the FAA as set forth in Southland was
to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration as a process of resolving
29. Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe's Elecs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Although state law applies to contracts to arbitrate to determine if the parties agreed to arbitrate,
there is a body of federal substantive law created by the FAA governing arbitrability of disputes.
30. Julie S. Rial, Origins of Common Law, InternationalEncyclopedia of Justice Studies (Dec.
2002) availableat http://www.iejs.com/Law/originsof commonlaw.htm.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Edward L. Glasser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, Yale Law School, Economics and
Organization Workshop, 23 (2002).
34. UnderstandingCommon Law, Sovereign Services (1994), http://www.buildfreedom.com.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). There has been a long standing
hostility between courts and arbitration. Id.
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disputes.31 Until recent years, American courts generally viewed arbitration
with suspicion.39 Federal decisions ordering arbitration to replace jury trials,
when an underlying contract contains a pre-dispute contractual arbitration
clause, have resulted in negative feelings about the use of arbitration in
consumer cases within the plaintiffs bar.4 ° Some consumer groups have
purchased billboards and personified arbitration as an evil personage that
robs average consumers of their due. 4'
Arbitration is not a thief. Arbitration is not a person. Arbitration is a
conflict resolution process used to resolve disputes that resembles a bench
trial. There is not much mystery in the process. Arbitration has been around
for centuries and has been used all over the world to resolve conflicts. 2 In
the 17th Century, English courts held arbitration was a non-binding
process.4 3 The English courts became concerned that arbitration had the
potential to displace or oust the court's role in society."J Through a series of
court decisions limiting the effect of arbitration, the English courts began to
view arbitration as a non-binding process based upon the principle of agency
revocability. 45 The English reversed their position on binding arbitration in
1889, but American courts continued down the old common law path. 6 The
38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

See id Jere Beasley, an Alabama trial attorney, publishes a monthly newsletter in which

he uses a negative traffic symbol to portray arbitration.

The Jere Beasley Report, available at

http://www.beasleyallen.com/jlb-report/arbitration.htm. The symbol is a circle containing the word
"arbitration" with a line drawn through it diagonally. Id.
41. Alabama highway billboards sponsored by a "grass roots" consumer movement against
arbitration personify arbitration as a thief who steals rights: "Arbitration Steals Your Right To A
Jury Trial."
42. LEONARD L. RISKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 503 (1997). Nearly all-ancient
civilizations record the use of arbitration. Moses used arbitration during the Exodus. The Romans
and Greeks used the process in connection with their court systems. In the Middle Ages it was used
in the European guild system to resolve disputes. Arbitration was present in English common law
and was brought to America by the colonists. George Washington used arbitration to resolve
Virginia land. In Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609), Lord Coke opined that the English
court's views of arbitration as revocable at will by the parties who had contracted to use it. Id. The
rle set forth in Vynior's Case was that the arbitrators were agents of the parties, and the arbitrator's
agency could be revoked by the parties at any time until an arbitration hearing had been held. Id
This became known as the revocability doctrine. A second reason to make arbitration revocable was
the "ouster doctrine." Courts were afraid that arbitration would oust them from their jurisdiction
over legal matters. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46.

The English Arbitration Act of 1889 made arbitration agreements irrevocable.
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common law doctrine of revocability was followed by American courts until
the enactment of the FAA in 1925. 4 ' The doctrine of revocability was
grounded in the public law courts fear that they might be displaced by a
private process of dispute resolution and thereby be put out of work.
The American judiciary's view of arbitration prior to the FAA was that
the parties' pre-dispute contract to use arbitration, instead of the public
courts, to resolve the dispute would result in an improper removal or ouster
of the court's jurisdiction.48 Some state statutes still follow the old common

law view of arbitration. For example, Alabama's anti-pre-dispute arbitration
statute, Ala. Code § 8-1-41 (3), follows the common law view of arbitration
from the 18th and 19th centuries. 49 After the passage of the FAA in 1925,

many states adopted modem arbitration statutes in order to align their state
law with current federal law on arbitration, but other states like Alabama
hung on to its old laws. From American Colonial times until 1925, several
state statutes and the greater body of American case law held binding pre-

dispute contractual arbitration agreements to be unenforceable and revocable
at will by the parties who contracted for arbitration. 50
III.

THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: NEW YORK
ARBITRATION ACT TO SOUTHLAND AND BEYOND

On April 19, 1920, the State of New York enacted section 2386(f) Code
of Civil Procedure, the New York Arbitration Act (NYAA). Today the
NYAA has been expanded into Consolidated Laws of New York, which
makes contractual arbitration agreements binding in New York.5' In 1924,
the United States Supreme Court decided Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross
Line. The Court held that the New York Arbitration Act could be used to
47. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (No. 14065) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). A
Massachusetts court refused to order specific performance of an arbitration agreement contained in a
public works contract. Id. The Tobey court stated it was impractical to use equity to order
arbitration and the plaintiff should exercise the legal remedies available. Id. In Home Insurance
Company of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874), the United States Supreme Court held predispute agreements to arbitrate were invalid due to the common law revocability of such agreements.
Id.
48. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, ARBITRATION LAW 2-3 (Foundation Press 2003); KATHERINE
V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE, THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 305 (Foundation
Press) (2003); ynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep 595.
49. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1975).
50. The Birmingham News Co. v. Hom, 901 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 2004). Under common law predispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements were considered revocable at will by the parties
involved, if either desired to back out of the agreement prior to an arbitration hearing. The FAA
makes such agreements enforceable.
51. N.Y., C.P.L.R. 7500 et. seq. The consolidated laws of New York are the latest version of
the New York Arbitration Act.
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enforce specific performance of a 52
contract to arbitrate, but it could not be
used as a complete bar to litigation.
Following hearings that hashed and re-hashed the nature of the FAA, the
United States Congress failed to vote on the first version of a federal
arbitration statute in 1922. The proposed statute was withdrawn and
amended by its supporters and the American Bar Association and
resubmitted to Congress in 1924. 53 It was enacted as the United States
Arbitration Act (USAA) on February 12, 1925. 54 The language of the
USAA was principally patterned after the language of the NYAA, but
contained some significant changes. 5 The USAA was eventually codified
as the United States Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Title 9 of the United
States Code, on July 30, 1947. The hearings held prior to the original
enactment of the USAA in 1925, did not indicate that the act would be
binding on state courts.56 In fact, the FAA did not contain so much as a
sentence fragment granting federal jurisdiction in arbitration cases.57
According to Professor Ian MacNeil's book, American ArbitrationLaw:
Reformation-Nationalization-Internationalization,
there were a number of

organizations across the United States that endeavored to promote binding
arbitration in the late 1800s and early 1900s.58 The American Bar
Association (ABA) got behind these efforts and spear-headed the movement
to get a national arbitration act to Congress. 59 However, due to some
objections to the first draft of the USAA, the ABA withdrew and revised the
52.

DONALD J. KENNEDY, MARITIME ARBITRATION 1899-1999 (2003).

Although the New

York Arbitration Act promised to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility regarding arbitration,
its initial test in the court, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. 109 (1924), held that the

New York statute was an available remedy to enforce a contract, but not a bar to litigation.
53.

IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNALIZATION 42 (1992). Professor MacNeil traces the history of arbitration in America through
the 19th and 20th Centuries. Id. He includes the beginning of the movement to change arbitration
law from holding arbitration agreements unenforceable to holding them enforceable in federal
courts. Id. He traces the history of the FAA from the efforts of a few to the push by the ABA to get
the act through Congress. Id. He discusses the impact of Southland and moves on to discuss
international arbitration and the New York Convention. Id. MacNeil criticizes the Southland Court
for ignoring the history of the FAA and transforming the act into a different kind of law than the one
envisioned by its drafters. Id. Although MacNeil's conclusions about the FAA have been
challenged by some scholars, his historical digest of the FAA's early years is without equal. Id.
54. Id. at 47.
55. Id. at 52.
56. Id. at 117-18.
57. 9 U.S.C.A. § I et. seq.
58. MACNEIL, supra note 53.
59. Id. at 48.
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USAA and resubmitted it to Congress. 6' The revised draft was eventually

passed in virtually the same form as it exists today.6'
Following its passage in 1925, the USAA was used in federal courts, if a
binding pre-dispute arbitration contract clause was present in a federal
case. 62 Federal courts refused to order arbitration under the USAA if the
matter was litigated in a state court, before being removed to the federal
court on diversity grounds.63 This was due at least in part to the Erie
doctrine's state law application mandates.
Following Southland the
references in the case law to Erie all but disappeared, and federal courts now
routinely cite section two of the FAA, placing arbitration agreements in any
court "upon the same footing as other contracts." 4
There is no specific language in the FAA that states there is a federal
policy in favor of arbitration which preempts contrary state law. 65 The
federal policy favoring arbitration language came from Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Company and was confirmed
and expounded upon by the United States Supreme Court in Southland.66
Southland, using the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause as

bridges, harmonized the outcome of arbitration under the FAA with the
outcome of arbitration under state law.67

While the Erie doctrine was

discussed in arbitration cases prior to Southland, such as Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Company of America, federal courts declined to disturb the
perceived procedural status of the FAA until Southland.68 Although the
60. Id. at 91-101.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 107.
63. MACNEIL, supra note 53.
64. HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41, 43 (2003) (Justice Torruella
wrote, "Congress enacted the FAA to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts and to render them valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.")
65. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et. seq.
66. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also
Southland, 465 U.S. at 1 ("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.... The Federal
Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause.... Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications
that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in
the federal courts.")
67. Id.; Justice Brennan cited "the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of
arbitration agreements." Id.at 22-23. He further stated "any doubts should be resolved in favor of
arbitration." Id.
68. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt entered into an
employment contract containing an arbitration clause in New York. Id.Bernhardt later moved to
Vermont, and performed his duties under the employment contract in Vermont. Id. Bernhardt was
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early arbitration cases acknowledged the problem of state versus federal
court forum shopping, they did not correct the problem because they viewed
the FAA as procedural.6 9
The state court ruling in Southland followed the general understanding
of the time between state law and the FAA. 70 The California Supreme
Court's ruling in Southland closely followed the principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in 1956, in Bernhardt.7 1 Bernhardtviewed the
FAA as a procedural statute.72 Bernhardt confirmed the principle of
eliminating forum shopping by stating the same result should be obtained in
state and federal courts as had been previously enunciated in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York.73 Therefore, the trial court's ruling in Southland followed the
prevailing law in pre-Southland arbitration cases, but treated the FAA as a
substantive law act using a broad interpretation of "affecting commerce."
IV.

LOCATING THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF CONGRESS: COUPLING THE FAA

AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ATTACHING BOTH TO THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE

At the time Southland was decided, some states had statutes making
the enforcement of arbitration agreements illegal as a matter of public
policy. 74 Since Southland, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that the Commerce Clause, as it applies to FAA sanctioned arbitrations,
must be interpreted broadly so as to apply to state court actions affecting
fired by Polygraphic Company of America, Inc., while working in Vermont. Id. He brought a
lawsuit against Polygraphic in a Vermont state court, and Polygraphic removed it to federal district
court. Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 198. The U.S. District Court denied Polygraphic's motion to compel
arbitration due to the Erie doctrine requirement of following state law in cases removed on diversity
grounds. Id. at 200. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion which remanded the case to the
federal district court in Vermont to determine which state law, Vermont or New York, applied to
Bernhardt's case. Id. at 199. Justice Douglas opined that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins required the
case to be decided by local law. Id. Justice Douglas based the court's treatment of Bernhardt on
principles set forth in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and stated "If the federal
court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of the litigation might
depend on the courthouse where suit is brought." Id. at 203.
69. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 206-08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Bernhardt concluded that the FAA was tied to U.S. Constitution Article III,
Section 2 and "does not obviously apply to diversity cases." Id. at 208.
70. Id.
71. Compare Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 204, with Southland, 465 U.S. at 1.
72. Bernhardt,350 U.S at 203.
73. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 99.
74. See ALA. CODE 8-1-41(3); see also WARE, supra note 1.
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interstate commerce. 75 The United States Supreme Court has also made it
clear that the Supremacy Clause preempts any contrary state statute that
conflicts with the FAA, because the FAA clearly expresses the intent of
Congress to enforce arbitration agreements to the full reach of the
Commerce Clause.76

For nearly sixty years the United States Supreme Court, in apparent
compliance with Erie, held that state law should be applied to arbitration
agreements in state courts. 7

Cases prior to Southland narrowly construed

the meaning of interstate commerce, and thus narrowly construed the
applicability of the FAA. This narrow view of commerce coupled with the
Erie doctrine forced federal courts to apply state law in diversity cases like
Bernhardt. Erie was pure federalism. Therefore, Southland was seen as
inconsistent with federalism, although it was rendered by a Court supportive
of federalism principles.78 Justice O'Connor and Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion is indicative of the federalist's critique of Southland.
Professor Stephen Ware opines that the federal courts were able to
separate the procedural from the substantive when applying the Erie
doctrine.79 The Supreme Court then took a serious look at upholding
arbitration clauses through a series of cases. 80 Federal courts used their own
rules and procedures, if a case was removed from a state court to a federal
court, but avoided using their decisions to create federal substantive law in
state court cases. 8' The problem with this approach was that if various state
arbitration laws were applied in removal cases it could encourage forum
shopping.82
Southland addressed the forum shopping problem by preempting state
law. The United States Supreme Court in Southlandinterpreted the statutory
intent of Southland under the Commerce Clause and enforced arbitration
agreements in state courts with a Supremacy Clause argument.83 When
Southland interpreted the FAA as a substantive law act which furthered the
Congressional intent of the Commerce Clause, it extended the reach of the
75.
76.

Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-58 (2003).
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

77.

David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration: Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory

Interpretation:The Supreme Court and the FederalArbitrationAct, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(2004). Professor Schwartz addresses the impact of Southland on Erie. He concludes that
Southlandwas not a good decision when it was made, but the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
overrule its own precedent in Southland. Id.
78. Id. at 54.
79. WARE, supra note 1, at 54.
80. Id.
81. See Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 198.
82. Id.
83. Southland,465 U.S. at 1.
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FAA into state courts.84 State law could never be preempted by a federal
procedural law, but state law could be preempted by a federal substantive
law act under the Supremacy Clause.
V.

PRECEDING CASES THAT SET THE STAGE FOR SOUTHLAND

The first significant departure from ordinary contract law governing
contractual arbitrations came in the 1967 case of Prima Paint v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co. 85 Prima Paint required federal courts to give
special consideration to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in regular contracts.86
The requirement of a special examination of arbitration clauses became
known as the separability doctrine.87 It required federal courts to separate
the arbitration clause from its so-called container contract for examination.88
Arbitration clauses were to be carved out and examined on their own
merits. 89 Prima Paint required courts to determine if the arbitration clause
itself was under attack or if the contract as a whole was being challenged. If
the contract as a whole was alleged to be void ab initio, then the case would
be sent to arbitration where the arbitrator(s) would decide the issues.90 If the
arbitration clause itself was challenged, then courts would decide if the

parties had agreed to arbitrate, and if arbitration was appropriate. 9'

This

84. Id.
85. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Prima Paint filed
suit to rescind the entire contract with Flood & Conklin, including the arbitration clause, based on
fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole. Id. at 399. The federal district court stayed the
case and sent the matter to arbitration. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id. Tying the
contract to interstate commerce instead of state contract law, the United States Supreme Court
expressed what has become known as the "separability doctrine." An allegation of fraud in the
inducement of the contract as a whole will be decided by the arbitrators, unless the parties
specifically withheld that issue from arbitration. Id. The Prima Paint Court ruled that arbitration
clauses are separable from the contract in which they are embedded. Id. Citing Section 4 of the
arbitration clause, the courts may adjudicate it, but if there is a claim of fraud against the contract as
a whole that claim will be arbitrated. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 399. In a motion opposing a stay, a
federal court may only examine issues relating to the arbitration clause itself to determine the
validity of the stay. Id.
86. Id. at 395-402.
87. Id. at 402-03, 411.
88. Id. at 402-03.
89. ld. at 403.
90. PrimaPaint,388 U.S. at 403.
91. Id. at 404.
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"special" analysis went well beyond placing arbitration clauses on the same
footing as other contracts.92

This case was the beginning of elevated status in federal courts for
contractual pre-dispute arbitration clauses, because Prima Paint gave pre-

dispute arbitration agreements a unique status in contract law.9 3 Pursuant to
Prima Paint, federal courts allow immediate review of orders denying

arbitration, but disallow immediate appellate review of orders granting
arbitration.94 Federal courts therefore treat arbitration agreements differently

from other contracts.95 Courts that review arbitration awards do not review
the awards based upon general contract principles, but the standards of
review are limited to those set forth in the FAA.96
The second major step on the path to Southland came in the 1983 United
97
States Supreme Court case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. In
Moses H. Cone, the Court declared a "liberal federal policy" favoring

arbitration, holding that §2 of the FAA created a body of "federal

substantive law of arbitrability." 98 Although Moses H. Cone involved a
controversy over the issuance of a stay in a federal lawsuit until the state law

claims had been resolved, its language regarding arbitration would resurface

92.

CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

CASES AND PROBLEMS, 54

(2002).
93. Id.at 403-04.
94. South Louisiana Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 300-01
(La. 2004). Interlocutory appeals from an order denying arbitration are "final" and thus appealable,
but appeals from an order compelling arbitration are not appealable on an interlocutory basis.
95. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Motion to compel arbitration in a class action based upon Fair Labor Standards Act was granted.
Arbitration clauses are not reviewed using the same standards as other contracts.
96. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. United Steel Workers of America, 337 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (Mass.
2004).
97. Moses H. Cone Mem '1 Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, a North
Carolina medical facility, contracted with Alabama contractor Mercury Construction Corporation for
additions to its physical plant. Id.The hospital drafted the contract between the two businesses, and
the contract contained an arbitration clause. Id.Following disagreements over construction delays
and money issues, unsuccessful attempts at negotiation were followed by a declaratory judgment
action filed by the hospital in a North Carolina state court. Id.The state court issued an injunction
against arbitration, but rescinded the order upon protest by Mercury Construction. Id. After the stay
was lifted, Mercury Construction filed a lawsuit in federal district court and moved to compel
arbitration the federal district court stayed the federal case until resolution of the state court case. Id.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the federal district court and remanded the
case for arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem '1Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1-2. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, and in doing so used the language that would soon become
commonplace in federal arbitration cases. Id. at 2. Relying on the Commerce Clause argument for
enforcement of arbitration, and citing both FAA Section 2 and Prima Paint,the Court spoke of a
"federal policy favoring arbitration." Id.at 24.
98. id.at 24.
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in Southlandas explaining the federal policy in favor of arbitration.99 Moses
H. Cone also paved the way for the holding in Southland because it
enunciated a federal policy in favor of arbitration by using a Commerce
Clause argument. 00 The special contract analysis required under Prima
Paint and the favoritism enunciated in Moses H. Cone, in some ways
"telegraphed the punch" of the Supreme Court in Southland.0 1
VI. THE ACADEMY SPEAKS OUT ON SOUTHLAND: WHAT OTHERS HAVE
SAID

The shift in the High Court's preference for arbitration did not go
unnoticed by legal scholars. 10 2 While there is no general consensus among
legal scholars on the rationale or effect of Southland,legal scholars appear to
locate themselves within or near two distinct camps regarding the Southland
opinion: Southland is good law or Southland is bad law. Some scholars,
like Professor Jean Sternlight have questioned the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Southland,103 while others like Professor Richard Reuben have
explored the impact of this shift on the way state courts treat contractual
arbitration clauses.1°4 Professor Stephen Ware and others have defended
Southland and the United States Supreme Court's current position on
arbitration. 0 5 One of the leading critics of Southland has been Professor Ian
MacNeil, whose book American Arbitrationprovides an in-depth analysis of
the legislative history of the FAA. 10 6 Professor Christopher Drahozal,

99. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 35.
100. Id at 35-37.
101. Seeid. at35-37.
102. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court'sPreference
for Binding Arbitration:A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers andDue Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration
and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON D1SP. RESOL. 669
(2001), and Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preferencefor Binding Arbitration,74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637 (1996). Professor Sternlight remains one
of binding arbitrations most vocal critics regarding access to justice issues.
103. See id.
104. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997). Professor Reuben has questioned the impact of
binding arbitration under the FAA on other areas of law.
105. Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State
ConstitutionalJury Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 passim (2003). Professor Ware defends
arbitration clauses because people have a right to contract, and that right should not be denied. Id.
106. MACNEIL, supranote 53.
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supports Southland's outcome as the correct decision, even though the
Court's reasoning may have been flawed. 10 7 In Professor Drahozal's view,
the majority in Southland may have used weak analysis, but the correct
conclusion was reached.'0 8 Still other scholars like Professor Reuben
question the long-term impact of Southland on other areas of the law like
individual rights.
VII. THE

PRIMARY EFFECT OF SOUTHLAND ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM:

PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTI-ARBITRATION LAWS

Federal courts rely on the Supremacy Clause to preempt state antiarbitration laws and uphold the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause to enforce the mandates of the FAA.'0 9 In Southland, the Supreme
Court held that Congress in 1925 had intended that the FAA be a substantive
law act enforcing the Commerce Clause in all courts, and had never intended
the FAA to be limited to Article III procedural matters.110 Southland
resolved the continuing conflict between state and federal arbitration law by
using the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause as applied to the
FAA to nullify the effect of state anti-arbitration laws."1
Although the Southland argument under Commerce Clause was
persuasive for a majority of the court, the dissenting opinions of Justice
Stevens, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in Southland pointed out
the fact that the FAA's history was purely procedural. 1 2 Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor's review of congressional hearings preceding the FAA
concludes that Congress never intended for the FAA to become a substantive
law act.' 13 Since members of Congress who held these hearings prior to the
FAA's passage can no longer be called upon to explain their intent in
passing the FAA, because they died years ago, there is a presumption
argument on both sides of the issue.
The dissenting opinions in Southland seem to suggest Southland's true
purpose was to establish a stare decisis favoring the use of arbitration
107. Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Re-examining the Legislative History
of the FederalArbitrationAct, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002)passim. See also Christopher R.
Drahozal, Revisiting Southland, 10 No. 3 DISP. RESOL MAG., 24 (Spring 2004)
108. Id.
109. Nathan E. Ross, Federalism v. The Greater Good... Should Powerful Franchisors be
Allowed to Contractfor the Home Court Advantage Through Forum Selection Clauses?, 2000 J.

DIsP. RESOL. 199, 212 (2000). The power given to Congress under the Constitution allows federal
law to preempt contrary state law.
110.
111.

Southland, 465 U.S. at 11.
Id. See also Guaranty Trust, Co., 326 U.S. at 99.

112.
113.

Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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agreements in contracts nationwide, rather than offering an interpretation of4
Congress' true intent, to enforce the Commerce Clause using the FAA."

Perhaps the majority's interpretation of Congressional intent in Southland
stretches the interpretative envelope, but it also accomplishes the goal of
harmonizing the approach to arbitration in all American courts. Two of the
major effects of Southland on the legal system have been to eliminate state
court forum shopping in arbitration cases and uniting the legal system on a
divisive issue.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Perry v. Thomas revisited the Southland

opinion:
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50 years in 1973,
apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility that the Act
had pre-empted state-created rights. It is only in the last few years that the Court has
effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did
not intend.' 15

Justice Stevens viewed Southland as a rewriting of the FAA to make the
statute substantive law so as to preempt state arbitration law." 6 The

Southland opinion thus created uniformity in the treatment of arbitration
clauses, no matter which type of court was presented with a motion to
compel arbitration." 7

Southland led to cheers from the business community and jeers from the
plaintiff's bar and consumer advocacy groups.' 18 The long-term effects of
Southland on Constitutional issues such as access to justice and the waiver
of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial are still in the refinement
stage. However, there is no question that Southland has resulted in residual
114. Id.
115. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent in
Perry v. Thomas compared the 1973 case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, to
Perry. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). He
concluded that in those two cases, the same facts yielded different results, due to the Supreme
Court's rewriting of the FAA in Southland. Id.
116. Id. at493-94.
117. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 53.
118. See, e.g., Jean Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preferencefor Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (exploring the issue of whether "arbitration
agreements may unconstitutionally deprive persons of their right to a jury trial, to a judge and to due
process of law"); see also Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "Justice",36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 535 (2005)
("depriving large numbers of consumers of access to our court system without their consent could
not have been the intent of the drafters of the FAA.").
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effects reaching across several areas of the law. The clarification of these
effects will take time to fully develop.

VIII. THE SOUTHLAND PROGENY: STATE ARBITRATION LAWS DIE HARD
The next major state law preemption case following Southland was
Allied-Bruce Terininix Cos. v. Dobson."9 Alabama Code section 8-1-41(3)
declared pre-dispute arbitration clauses could not be specifically enforced in
Alabama.
In Terminix, the Supreme Court of Alabama interpreted
Southland to hold that Congress' power to enforce the Commerce Clause
under the FAA was limited to situations where the parties contemplated that
20
interstate commerce would be substantially affected by their transaction.1
After weighing the facts of Terminix, the Supreme Court of Alabama
determined that the parties did not contemplate that interstate commerce
would be substantially affected by a termite bond issued on Dobson's
residence, and that the state anti-arbitration statute, Alabama Code section 81-41(3), applied. 12' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found the
Supreme Court of Alabama's reasoning was based on too narrow an
interpretation of term "affecting commerce," and held that the words
"affecting commerce" should receive a very broad interpretation. The
United States Supreme Court held that the transaction's actual effect on
commerce, rather than the contemplation of the parties should determine
whether the FAA applied. 22 In Terminix, the United States Supreme Court
held that pest control chemicals shipped across state lines
to treat an
23
individual's home substantially affected interstate commerce.
In addition to the language of FAA § 2, the language from Southland
was generously used in Terminix. Justice Breyer stated in Terminix that
"Nothing significant has changed in the 10 years subsequent to Southland;
no later cases have eroded Southland's authority."' 124 It is interesting that
Justice Breyer referred to Southland's authority rather that the authority of
the FAA. Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurrence, "Today's decision
caps this Court's effort to expand the Federal Arbitration Act. Although
each decision has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the initial
building block in Southlandlaid a faulty foundation.' 2 5 Although Terminix
may have presented the Court with a significant opportunity to limit or even
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995).
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993).
Id. at357.
Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-77.
Id. at280-81.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 272.
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overturn Southland, due to the head-on collision between the FAA and
Alabama Code section 8-1-41(3) occurring in a state court, the United States
Supreme Court stood by Southland
and strengthened the federal policy
12 6
favoring arbitration in Terminix.
There are at least two schools of thought regarding the impact of
Terminix on state anti-arbitration laws: (1) the line of reasoning followed by
the United States Supreme Court, and (2) the line of reasoning followed by
the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Terminix opinion by the United States
Supreme Court did not deter the Alabama Supreme Court from attempting to
find some other way to uphold Alabama's public policy on pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.

In Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering

Company, Inc., the Supreme Court of Alabama reasoned that Alabama Code
section 8-1-41(3) was not declared unconstitutional by Terminix, but the
application of the FAA to the facts in Terminix resulted in a transaction that
substantially affected interstate commerce.' 27 This interpretation led the
Supreme Court of Alabama to devise a five-prong test to determine when
commerce is substantially affected. 128 The test created a line of statecommerce-only cases governed by Alabama's anti-arbitration statute, and a
parallel line of cases held to be substantially affecting interstate commerce
governed by the FAA. 2 9

Part of the Alabama court's reasoning may have been a
misunderstanding of the intent of the Terminix decision, but the public
policy of Alabama, as expressed in Alabama Code section 8-1-41(3),
probably played a major role in the establishment of the two streams of
cases. Unlike federal judges who are appointed, Alabama's Supreme Court
justices are elected. State Supreme Court justices answer in the ballot box to
the citizens' assessment of their performance in upholding Alabama's
laws. 3 ° They have a moral and ethical duty to follow the wishes of their
constituency, but they also have a duty to follow the rule of law in their
126. Id.
127. Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (2000). This case
explains that in Terminix, "the United States Supreme Court held that for an arbitration clause to be
enforceable under the FAA the transaction to which the contract relates must turn out, in fact, to
involve interstate commerce, regardless of the contemplation of the parties." Id. at 760; see also
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (a criminal case which extracted limiting language concerning
the coverage of the Commerce Clause.)
128. Sisters of the Visitation, 775 So. 2d at 761.
129. Id.
130. See Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story: Arbitration Shows Law's Connection to Politics
and Culture, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2000, at 24.
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decisions. The Alabama Supreme Court endeavored to do both things with a
new line of reasoning.
The Supreme Court of Alabama explained their new line of reasoning in
Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran PlasteringCompany, Inc.,'3 an Alabama
case which utilized the Commerce Clause limitation language contained in
United States v. Lopez. 3 2 The United States Supreme Court held in Lopez
that Congress' power to enforce the Commerce Clause was not unlimited.
Lopez was a school zone gun case that had nothing to do with arbitration, but
everything to do with limiting the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. In Sisters of the Visitation, the Supreme Court of Alabama used the
holding in Lopez to construct a five-prong test to determine if the underlying
transaction leading to the contract containing the pre-dispute arbitration
clause substantially affected interstate commerce, thereby activating the
FAA mandate to arbitrate. 13 If the facts of each case met all five-prongs of
the Sisters substantial interstate commerce contracts test it was said to fall
under the mandate of the FAA to arbitrate. 3 4 However, if the facts met only
one or two of the prongs of the Sisters test it was governed by Alabama
Code section 8-1-41(3),
because the power of Congress to control commerce
135
was not unlimited.
The second school of thought regarding the effect of Terminix on
Alabama Code section 8-1-41(3) was enunciated in Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, Inc. by the United States Supreme Court.13 6 Alafabco held that the
words "involving commerce" should be given the broadest possible
reading. 37 The interpretation of "involving commerce" set forth inAlafabco
is the equivalent of "affecting commerce," and this definition does not allow
the states much "wiggle room" in drafting anti-arbitration statutes. 38 It is
clear from Alafabco that the federal courts will enforce almost any
arbitration clause under the FAA's mandate to arbitrate, and any contrary
state law will be preempted. 39 In fact, Alafabco held that "Congress'
Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in individual cases without
showing any specific effect on interstate commerce.'",40

131. Sisters of the Visitation, 775 So. 2d at 761-65.
132. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). A criminal case regarding the use of a gun
within a prohibited zone. The case used limiting language under the Commerce Clause.
133. Sisters ofthe Visitation, 775 So. 2d at 774-79.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Alafabco, 539 U.S. at 56-59.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id
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Alabama has been at the forefront of the Southland controversy, but
other states have also failed to accept the FAA mandates until a few
struggles highlighted the tension between state public policy and the FAA.
Some states have attempted to limit or eliminate arbitration altogether, if
certain conditions are not met. 14 1 A Montana statute, for example, required
any contract containing an arbitration clause to post a notice of the
arbitration clause in bold letters on the front page of the contract to protect
the unwary.1 42 However, the United States Supreme Court held in Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the statute's notice requirement was
unconstitutional because it placed arbitration on a different footing from
other contracts. 4 3 A New York statute disallowed punitive damages in
arbitration based upon a public policy against punitive damages in contract
cases. 144 A contract containing an arbitration clause also contained choice of
law language selecting New York law to govern the contract in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.145 The arbitrators returned

an award containing punitive damages contrary to New York law.
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court upheld the arbitrator's award of

punitive damages based upon the contract itself not excluding punitive
damages. 4 6 Thus, parties to an arbitration agreement may contract for
potential arbitration awards that are contrary to state law.147
Federal courts generally enforce state laws that support arbitration, even
if those laws are not worded exactly like the FAA. 1 The federal courts

141. California and Montana have statutes that limit the use of arbitration, while Alabama Code
section 8-1-41(3) prohibits enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
142. MONTANA CODE ANN. 27-5-114(4).
143. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-89 (1996). The United States
Supreme Court held that courts cannot enforce a state policy that places arbitration clauses on
unequal footing with other contracts. Special notice requirements do not apply to other contracts in
Montana, so special notice requirements could not be applied to arbitration clauses.
144. New York Civil Practice Act, as interpreted by Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d
793 (N.Y. 1976).
145. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). The arbitrators
granted punitive damages and the respondent appealed citing New York law's prohibition on
punitive damages in arbitration awards. The United States Supreme Court allowed the punitive
damages based upon the language of the underlying contract not excluding punitive damages.
146. Id. at 58.
147. Id.
148. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). The United States
Supreme Court upheld that opinion of the California Court of Appeal that California's arbitration
law, although much different from the FAA, did not conflict with the FAA because a contract to
arbitrate would be enforceable under California arbitration law. Volt involved a construction
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have made it clear that state laws eliminating arbitration will be preempted
by the FAA, and only generally recognized state law contract defenses will
49
be allowed to overcome the federal presumption in favor of arbitration.'

The federal presumption is that arbitration clauses should be enforced, and
any doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 5° District courts
should not only stay litigation until the arbitration is completed, but also
should stay litigation in the event a denied motion to compel arbitration has
been appealed. 5 ' The federal judiciary has made its point vividly clear with
regard to state laws limiting or eliminating contractual binding arbitration.
Any state law which allows state courts to by-pass the mandates of the FAA
will be pre-empted. There are no exceptions.
IX.

THE PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL LAW BY THE

FAA:

WAIVER OF THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN ARBITRATION

At the time Southland was decided, it was understood that in order to
waive the constitutional right to a jury trial, a person had to knowingly and
intelligently waive that right by signing an agreement. This was not a major
problem prior to Southland, but it became a sticky issue in some of
Southland's progeny. Does a waiver require signatures to be held valid?
What standards of assent will be applied? The so-called "shrink wrap" cases
allowed the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses even when the
parties had not signed an arbitration agreement. In Hill v. Gateway a federal
court held, consumers were required to arbitrate their claim against a
computer manufacturer because the computer-shipping box contained not
only a computer, but also a package of shrink-wrapped documents notifying
the consumers of an arbitration requirement. 1 2 Thus, under a contractual
contract, containing an arbitration clause, but with a California choice of law provision. California
law requires arbitration to be stayed until pending related litigation is resolved.
149. See Alafabco, 539 U.S. at 56.
150. Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624 (2004). A general presumption in favor
of arbitration exists "and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration 'unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute."' Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,
650 (1986). A general arbitration clause is enforceable, even if contained in a contract that is
voidable unless the arbitration clause is challenged. Id. at 628 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
151. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
152. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997). Judge Easterbrook
opined that the consumers who purchased a computer were bound by the terms of a contract to
arbitrate contained inside the computer's shipping box, because the terms of the contract required the
consumer to return the computer within 30 days or be bound by the terms of the contract, including
the arbitration clause. Id. at 1147-48. Although initially questioned on grounds of warranty laws,
Hill is still considered good law in many federal courts. In Falbe v. Dell, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
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assent standard, assent to use arbitration as an alternative forum to courts can
be found by action or non-action.
However, not all federal courts follow the contractual assent rule. Some
federal courts have held that consumers may not be held to a waiver of their
rights by contractual assent, but require actual notice and a written waiver,
evidenced by a signature. 53 The United States Supreme Court has not dealt
with this waiver issue so as to clear up the divergent paths taken by federal
courts in this area of constitutional law.
A non-signatory party may also be held to assent to waiver by
endeavoring to use the contract containing the arbitration clause to their
advantage. Beneficiaries who did not sign a contract have also been held to
the terms of arbitration clauses when they seek to enforce the contract terms
against a signatory to the contract.15 4 For instance, Dobson, the Plaintiff in
Terminix, was a third-party beneficiary to the termite bond containing the
arbitration agreement.' 55 Therefore, the Supreme Court seems willing to
accept contractual assent by third parties.
X.

THE PANDORA'S Box OF SOUTHLAND'S PROGENY: CLASS ACTIONS AND

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Southlandopened the door to creative thinking by some members of the
plaintiffs' bar. Courts have been divided for years over the appropriateness
of class actions and punitive damages in arbitration. Some courts have ruled
out class actions in arbitration, while other courts have left the class action
determination to the arbitrators.156 In Green Tree Financial Corporationv.
Bazzle, one of Southland's progeny, the United States Supreme Court
opened the door to class actions in arbitration by holding that arbitrators, not

13188, the U.S. District Court used Hill to analyze a Dell computer case and order it to arbitration.
No. 04-C-1425, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13188, at *11 (N.D. Il. July 12, 2004). Judge Grady stated
in the Falbe case that the court's analysis "began and ended" with the 7th Circuit's decision in Hill.

Id.
153. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339-41 (D. Kan. 2000).
154. Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., No. 04-2322, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12772, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2004). The court held that principles of equitable estoppel may require a
non-signatory to be bound by the terms of a contract, including an arbitration clause, if the nonsignatory attempts to enforce the terms of the contract. Id. at * 1-12.
155. Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268.
156. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E. 2d 349, 361-62 (S.C. 2002) vacated in Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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courts, may determine whether a class action can be arbitrated. 157 Like the

punitive damages issue presented in Mastrobuono, the holding in Bazzle can
be interpreted to take a permissive approach if the contract language is silent
on class actions.' 58 The holding in Bazzle was notice to contract drafters that
remedies not excluded in the contract language may be included in the
arbitration. 159 This situation caused many contract drafters to reexamine
their standard arbitration clauses and shore up traditional boiler plate
language. 160 Some businesses may decide to litigate instead of arbitrate if
class actions and punitive damages are allowed by the arbitrators in cases
where the contract is silent; but they can only do so if they prove the contract
is not subject to the enforcement provisions of the FAA. 16 1 While it is not
clear how courts will treat future class action cases due to the far-reaching
implications of Bazzle, but the decision has certainly caused the business
157. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-55 (2003). Class actions in arbitration
have always presented problems for courts. Should the court interpret the contract to determine if a
class action is permissible, or should the arbitrators determine this issue? State and federal courts
have argued this issue for years, but the United States Supreme Court held in Bazzle that arbitrators
have the authority to allow or prohibit a class action. Bazzle puts contract drafters on notice to
include preclusion against class actions in arbitration or leave their clients at the mercy of the
arbitrators. Due to the holding in Bazzle, silence regarding arbitration class actions in ordinary
arbitration clauses leaves the client exposed to the potential of a class action. Bazzle is consistent
with prior holdings allowing courts to determine the existence of an agreement to arbitrate and its
applicability to the parties and the facts, while allowing the arbitrators to determine all other issues
related to the arbitration.
158. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56-64.
159. See Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudenceof the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 497, 539 (2004). Supporting that arbitration is here to stay and class arbitration is coming.
See id. at 498. Although Bazzle did not produce a unanimous decision, Huber points out that all the
Justices seem willing to accept the idea of a class action in arbitration. Id. at 538. The decisions of
arbitrators are set aside only on rare occasions. Id. at 529.
160. Alan S. Kaplinsky, & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update: Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle-Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 Bus. LAW. 1265 (2004). The
disagreements over the meaning of Bazzle continue. Does silence on class action mean there is a
green light or a red light to class actions in arbitration? No one really knows, but these two
practitioners argue that it is only a matter of time before the United States Supreme Court will clarify
this issue.
161. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004). Professor Ware
concludes a pre-dispute binding arbitration clause merely replaces the jury trial with arbitration. Id.
at 170-73. He points out that general contract defenses may be used against arbitration clauses, but
state anti-arbitration clauses may not be used to set aside arbitration. Id. at 170. Professor Ware
states that the FAA requires a contract law standard of consent, but many critics of the FAA wish to
apply a knowing consent standard. Id. at 181-83. The knowing consent standard was rejected in
favor of contract law standard of consent in Doctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Cassarotto. Professor Ware
does not accept the argument that consumer arbitration clauses should be treated differently from
contracts between businesses. Id. at 182. Professor Ware contrasts criminal and civil waivers and
concludes the contractual consent waiver rather than the knowing consent waiver will likely prevail
in future Supreme Court cases. Id.
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community a great deal of concern. 6 2 Arbitration clauses were presumed to
have protected business' exposure to class actions, but Bazzle raises
163

substantial doubt as to arbitration's ability to eliminate class actions.
Mastrobuono opened the door to the possibility of punitive damages in a
contract containing an arbitration clause, if the arbitration clause was silent
on the applicability of such damages, even if punitive damages were not
allowed by the state law governing the contract.
XI. TAKING CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION TO WORK AFTER SOUTHLAND:
THE ALL POWERFUL AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IN EMPLOYMENT CASES
The supporters of arbitration under the FAA point out that constitutional
rights and statutory rights are not inalienable and can be waived by
contract. 164 An argument has arisen over the type of consent needed for
waiver in employment cases and the results are mixed. While some of
arbitration's supporters want a contractual standard of consent, opponents
want a knowing standard of consent. 165 Contractual assent does not require

an employee to be given an explanation of arbitration, while knowing assent
requires evidence in writing of consent to arbitrate. 166 It may well be that the
federal presumption in favor of arbitration has virtually eliminated knowing
consensual waiver as a defense in contractual arbitration cases where the
employee is a party to the contract. 167 Employees are not generally held to

contractual waiver Title VII claims in union arbitration contracts, because

162. Robert J. Herndon, Mistaken Interpretation:The American Arbitration Association, Green
Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, and the Real State of Class-Action Arbitration in North
Carolina, 82 N.C.L. REV. 2128 (2004). Herndon begins this article by pointing out Bazzle was a
consolidation of two South Carolina class action suits involving a state consumer protection code.
See id. A divided United States Supreme Court heard the case, vacated the South Carolina
decisions, and remanded the matter back to South Carolina's Supreme Court. See id. at 2129. The
interpretation of Bazzle is important. See id. at 2129. Some view Bazzle as allowing arbitrators to
examine if a contract is silent as to class actions, while others contend that Bazzle allows arbitrators
to determine if a class action is allowed if the contract is silent. Id.
163. Hemdon, supra note 162 at 2129.
164. Jeffery W. Stempel, Symposium Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon:
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1384 (1996). Professor Stempel points out that consent is a thing of the past,
and quoting Professor Speidel, he summarizes that consent is lately a legal fiction. See id. at 1387.
Professor Stempel makes a case for court determination of consent. See id. at 1388.
165. Seeid. at 1381-82.
166. Seeid. at 1391.
167. Id.
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the employee plays no role in the formation of the contract, and 16the
of the union. 8

employee's interests are not always synonymous with those
Drafters of arbitration clauses may not receive a totally unencumbered
path to arbitration in statutory rights cases in the employment area.
Although a contracting party may have waived statutory rights by signing an
arbitration agreement, federal agencies may still have a cause of action on
behalf of the aggrieved party that is not subject to arbitration. 169 For
example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Waffle
House, the Court held that although an employee had waived statutory rights

claims, the EEOC had not been estopped from pursuing those claims under
the federal statute.

70

Employers who choose to insert arbitration agreements

into employment contracts can force the employee into arbitration but may
not be able to use the FAA to force a federal agency out of public law
courts. 17' Following Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the green

light was given to employers to use arbitration agreements in employment
contracts to force employees to arbitrate all claims, including statutory
claims.' 72 Today, there exists a serious debate over whether employees
their constitutionally guaranteed
should be forced to sign a contract waiving
1 73
rights in order to obtain employment.
XII. DEFENSES AGAINST THE FAA MANDATE TO ARBITRATE UNDER STATE
CONTRACT LAW AND DEFENSES TO AWARDS RENDERED

Defenses to arbitration agreements and avoidance of arbitration are
dependent upon state contract law defenses. All of the normal state law
defenses to contracts such as mutual mistake, detrimental reliance, and
unconscionability are available to a party seeking to avoid arbitration on the
grounds that the arbitration agreement is flawed. 1 74 Mutual mistake is not
often used as a defense to the arbitration contract, although it is conceivable
if the party seeking to set aside the arbitration agreement could prove the
168. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
169. See Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 297-98 (holding that government agencies can enforce
federal statutory claims in court, even when the employee has agreed to arbitrate those claims. The
employee is estopped, but the EEOC may proceed); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (opening the door for effective arbitration in employment disputes); see
also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (expanding the use of arbitration
agreements in employment contracts).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Kristin McCandless, Comment, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: The Debate Over
Arbitration in the Employment Context Rages On, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 225,228 (2002).
174. See Terminix, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
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parties agreed to different terms when forming the agreement to arbitrate.' 75
Detrimental reliance on terms that were fraudulently induced can serve as
grounds to rescind a contract. 17 6 The fundamentals of this defense are that
one party lied, the lie was intentional and was told for purposes of inducing
the other party to contract, the other party relied on the lie to enter the

contract and damages resulted. 77 Courts have also sustained breach of
contract claims against the drafters of contracts of adhesion when the
arbitration process contained in the contract lacked "the rudiments of evenhandedness."

'7 8

Courts have held that contracts that are constructed as one-

sided in favor of the drafter are unconscionable and are subject to
rescission. 7 9

These cases are, however, the exception to the reality of

arbitration agreements. In the vast majority of cases, agreements to arbitrate
are upheld and enforced by the courts.' 8°

Georgia was the first state to recognize manifest disregard of the law by
the arbitrator(s) as a ground for vacating an arbitration award.1 81 While there
is growing interest in manifest disregard of the law as a vehicle for
challenging arbitration awards, the definition of "manifest disregard of the
law" is still in the developmental stages.1 82 Another area of keen interest is
the potential of award challenges based on arbitrator bias. California has
passed new ethical standards for arbitrators requiring disclosure of past

175.

See GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 40-41 (1974).

176. See Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P. 2d 903, 925 (Cal. 1997). A cancer
victim sued an HMO for fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of the arbitration agreement. Id.
The court allowed the revision of the contract to arbitrate due to the misrepresentations. Id
177. See id. at 908.
178. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999). The arbitration panel
was composed of employer's managers in deciding an employee's claim. See id.
179. See id. at 940.
180. MACNEIL, supra note 53, at 148-50.
181. See Brent S. Gilfedder, "A Manifest Disregardof Arbitration?" An Analysis of Recent
Georgia Legislation Adding "'ManifestDisregardof the Law" to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a
Statutory Groundfor Vacatur, 39 GA. L. REv. 259, 260 (2004). Mr. Gilfedder points out that
Georgia became the very first state to add "manifest disregard of the law" as an additional ground to
vacate arbitration awards in 2003. See id He points out that manifest disregard of the law usually
means the award conflicts with public policy or it is arbitrary or capacious. See id As federal courts
have discovered, this standard for vacatur is difficult because it is ill defined. See id. He contends
"manifest disregard of the law" is an "illusory" concept so it cannot be applied on a consistent basis.
See id at 276. He cites cases in which federal courts have interpreted manifest disregard of the law
in various ways, but the central theme of these seems to be the arbitrators knew the law and ignored
it. See id.
at 278-81.
182. Gilfedder, supranote 181, at 278-81.
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dealings between arbitrators and the parties. 183 Although arbitrators and

arbitration providers oppose these new standards of disclosure, the
opponents of arbitration hope to prove arbitration bias through the
information obtained through these standards. 184 Arbitrator bias can also be
a ground upon which to assert a contract defense of unconscionability
against the arbitration process. 185 If the opponents of arbitration can
demonstrate financial ties to one of the parties by the arbitrators, they may
have grounds for setting aside any award rendered based on bias, 186 or
challenging the process on grounds of unconscionability. 187 Financial
consequences of the arbitration on the challenging party appear to be a more
difficult defense, unless there is proof on record of the financial inequities of
the process on one of the parties.' 88
In addition to the state law contract defenses to the arbitration
agreement, parties also have defenses to the arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10

lists the following grounds for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to
be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators. 589

183. Jaimie Kent, The Debate in California Over and Implications of New Ethical Standards
for ArbitratorDisclosure: Are the Changes Valid or Appropriate?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903,
913 (2004). This article discusses the new rules for arbitrators in California regarding disclosure of
repeat customers. Id. Forcing arbitrators to disclose their financial dealings with repeat players is
causing major controversy in California. Id. at 913-14. Several courts, state and federal, have
disallowed the applications of the new rules for various reasons. Id. at 916-18. Obviously, large
corporations, arbitrators whose incomes are largely derived from repeat business, and arbitration
providers like AAA oppose the new rules. Id. at 914. Kent concludes that some ethical disclosure
standards for arbitrators are necessary. Id. at 926.
184. Kent, supra note 183 at 912.
185. Id. at 911 n. 64.
186. Id. at 925.
187. Id. at 911 n. 64.
188. See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 939. The arbitrator panel had members with connections to the
business party. Id. at 938-39
189. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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All but one of the grounds involves arbitrator misconduct and all are
exceptionally difficult to prove.1 90
9 U.S.C. § 11 provides the following grounds for modifying or
correcting a flawed arbitration award:
(1) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(3) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy. 191
CONCLUSION

Prior to Southland, the chief problem for federal courts in diversity
cases containing arbitration clauses was that not all state arbitration laws
were the same. For example, New York promoted the use of pre-dispute
contractual arbitration, 92 Alabama prohibited the use of pre-dispute
contractual arbitration 93 and California allowed pre-dispute contractual

arbitration in some cases, while prohibiting it in others. 194

Therefore,

depending upon the state law to be applied by the federal courts under the
Erie principle to the facts of the cases, the outcomes could be radically

different. Such state-to-state variances could lead to forum shopping in
arbitration cases, which was troubling to the United States Supreme Court. 95
The cases prior to Southland offered little help in resolving the forum
shopping dilemma, because the FAA's language did not grant federal
jurisdiction in arbitration cases. 196 The FAA had been written like a federal
procedural act and it lacked the trappings of a substantive law act. Although

190. These grounds require the party seeking to set aside the award to submit proof of
wrongdoing by the arbitrators. However, no standard for submission of proof of wrongdoing is set
forth in the FAA.
191. 9U.S.C.§ll.
192. N.Y., C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1998).
193. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3).
194. Compare Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989) (noting that
California denied use of pre-dispute arbitration where there was litigation with a third party under a
California statute) with Southland, 465 U.S. 5 (noting that the California Supreme Court refused to
enforce the arbitration agreement pursuant to California law, but allowed other claims to be
arbitrated).
195. See, e.g., Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 202-03.
196. Id. at 200-02.
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the dilemma was addressed in early federal cases involving the FAA, there
appeared to be little the courts197could do about the problem, due to the
application of the Erie principle.
Southland addressed the problem and resolved the dilemma by
converting a procedural FAA into a substantive law act by placing a new
interpretation on the intent of Congress regarding the FAA.' 98 The majority
in Southland cited some of the testimony from the Congressional hearings
leading up to the FAA, and concluded that Congress had intended the FAA
to be substantive using a Commerce Clause argument.1 99 The minority in
Southland also cited testimony from the Congressional hearings leading up
to the FAA, and their conclusion was that the FAA was never intended to
apply in state courts.200 Southland's progeny share the theme of expansion
of the FAA's reach with their common ancestor. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams held that the Congressional intent behind the FAA was to regulate
commerce and preempt contrary state laws.20 ' Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co. held that state law must yield if it stands in the way of the
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress. 20 2 Contractual
arbitration agreements will be enforced unless state law contract defenses
apply. 20 3 The point of these cases seems to be that state contract law cannot
bring federal commerce to a halt by prohibiting the use of arbitration and
insisting upon litigation in every contracts case.
The progeny contain language from both the FAA and Southland and
usually a dissent or two stating the FAA was never intended to apply to the
state courts. Although the United States Supreme Court has had numerous
opportunities to limit or reverse its holding in Southland over the past
twenty-one years, it has declined to change its direction. Southland has
successfully sailed around the rocks of Erie, but the question remains, where
is arbitration going now that Southland has cleared the jettys?
Opponents of arbitration continue to attack the fairness of the process
and point out access to justice problems created by the contractual waivers
of rights contained in arbitration clauses. 204 Their argument is in essence a
repackaging of the old ouster doctrine under the common law, preferring
litigation over arbitration in consumer and employment cases. The common
197. Id. at 202.
198. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11.
199. See id.at 12-14.
200. See id.at 25-28.
201. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 112.
202. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-85 (2000).
203. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004).
204. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RES. 669, 70 (2001).
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law view of pre-dispute contractual arbitration as a revocable process, was
dealt a death blow by Southland. The question of whether Southland and its
progeny have resulted in legislation from the bench, or simply a more
accurate interpretation of Congressional statutory intent, becomes a moot
question in light of current federal law. Southland does not represent the
first case to reinterpret the intent behind existing statutory law, and it is
unlikely that Southland will be the last such case.20 5 Current federal case
law favors the enforcement of binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses, and
there is no indication by the courts or Congress that the rule of law in this
area is likely to change anytime soon. Arbitration's opponents appear to be
fighting a losing battle in their efforts to limit or eliminate the FAA and
reverse the holding in Southland. Perhaps their time would be better spent
in finding creative ways to use the FAA to benefit their clients, like the
claimants in Bazzle.2 °6
Southland's progeny are continuing to define the length and width of
arbitration's reach under the FAA. No doubt, some members of the legal
profession long for the days of yesteryear when the law was more static in
this area. However, the full effect of Southland and its progeny has yet to be
realized.
The initial issues of binding agreements to arbitrate and
preemption of state anti-arbitration laws have been resolved. The law in this
field has now moved on to address new issues like the availability of
punitive damages and class actions. It is likely to be some time before the
law is settled in those areas. Southland removed the lid from a Pandora's
Box of possibilities for enforcement of arbitration under the FAA because it
created a federal common law with regard to arbitration.
The only
organization that can replace that lid is the United States Congress, which
has not given the slightest indication of any impending efforts to limit or
eliminate the FAA.

205. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Ludwig Honold Mfg, Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d
1123, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1969); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
206. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-55.
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